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AGGRESSION, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, AND TERRORISM*
Larry May†
I. JUS AD BELLUM PRINCIPLES: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE IDEA OF STATE
AGGRESSION
If there are going to be trials for those who initiate or perpetrate an 
aggressive war, what constitutes an aggressive war, or an act of State ag-
gression, needs to be defined. Indeed, if individuals are going to be prose-
cuted, and their liberty put in serious jeopardy, for allegedly committing this 
crime, it is incumbent on the international community to have a very clear 
understanding of what State aggression is. Philosophers, diplomats, and 
lawyers have debated this topic for hundreds of years and have not all 
agreed. This article discusses several ideas about the definition of aggres-
sion in which there might be broad consensus, even if much of the terrain of 
aggression remains mired in political and ideological squabbles.  
A quite useful starting point for understanding State aggression is 
the relatively modern-sounding translation of Thomas More’s work. Here is 
part of More’s discussion of Just Wars in Book II, “Military Affairs,” of his 
famous work, Utopia:
Utopians ‘go to war only for good reasons: [1] to protect their own land, 
[2] to drive invading armies from the territories of their friends, or [3] to 
liberate an oppressed people in the name of humanity, from tyranny and 
servitude.’1
One can begin to understand what aggressive war is by first think-
ing about what it is not. And I would think that today many would agree 
that wars waged for the three reasons given by More would not be consi-
 *  This article is adapted and revised from the author’s book, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES
AGAINST PEACE (2008).  
 †  W. Alton Jones Chair of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University.  
1 THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 85 (George M. Logan & Robert M. Adams eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2002) (1516). See also RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 42 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1999) (discussing this passage). The standard translation of Utopia is the 
one edited by Edward Surtz, S.J. See ST. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA, in 4 THE COMPLETE WORKS 
OF ST. THOMAS MORE (Edward Surtz, S.J. & J.H. Hexter eds., Yale Univ. Press 1964) (1516). 
The Yale edition translates the passage as follows: “Yet they do not lightly go to war. They 
do so only to protect their own territory or to drive an invading enemy out of their friends’ 
lands or, in pity, for a people oppressed by tyranny, to deliver them by force of arms from the 
yoke and slavery of the tyrant, a course prompted by human sympathy.” Id. at 118.  
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dered aggressive wars. Indeed, it is interesting that, as far back as Augus-
tine, theorists held that war was most surely justified when undertaken on 
behalf of those who were innocently attacked, which included wars waged 
in defense of others as well as self-defensive wars.2
One could challenge this beginning idea, taken from Thomas More, 
by arguing that protecting State territory is not sufficient to warrant the tak-
ing of human life that is nearly inevitably a part of war. Invasion of territory 
does not necessarily mean that innocent people are attacked.  Indeed, territo-
ry can be uninhabited, for instance, as in the case of certain small islands.  If 
one State claims these islands and another State captures them, is this 
enough to justify initiating a war where it is highly likely that people, both 
combatants and noncombatants, will be killed? It can also be true that some 
islands claimed as part of a State’s territory provide no particular military or 
economic advantages for the State that claims them. If these islands are cap-
tured by another State, it would be unclear that the interests of the State, 
such as its ability to defend the populated mainland, or to have economic 
self-sufficiency for the populated mainland, would also be adversely af-
fected. So, it is not initially clear why simple invasion of one State’s territo-
ry by another State is aggression that warrants prosecution. 
It is possible to countenance a wider scope for what counts as State 
aggression when one eliminates State aggression as one of the elements of 
the crime of aggression.3 In deciding whether to condemn a State, rather 
than prosecute one of its leaders, one might allow for a simple “violation of 
territorial integrity” criterion to suffice, especially since there is a long his-
tory of using this criterion in international law.4  But, more than this should 
be needed for demonstrating State aggression as the first hurdle in establish-
ing the elements of the crime of aggression. And this is because when we 
put an individual’s liberty in jeopardy for a trial for such a crime, we need 
to make sure that the individual has indeed done something of commensu-
rate harm to the loss of liberty he or she is now forced to risk in the trial.5
Self-defense should also not be identified with merely repelling in-
vasion. The contrary position is supported by an analogy between States and 
individual human persons. The self of the human person is the person’s 
body and the corresponding self of the State is its territory. If a person’s 
body is attacked, this is the kind of aggression that will trigger a criminal 
trial. If a State’s territory is attacked, this is also supposed to be the kind of 
2 AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD  861–62, 866–67 (David Knowles ed., Henry Bettenson 
trans., Penguin Books 1984). 
3 See Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Definition of the Crime of Aggression: State Responsibility 
or Individual Criminal Responsibility?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
CRIME OF AGGRESSION 94 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004). 
4 I thank Simon Cabulea May for helping me clarify this point.  
5 See LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 139–56 (2005). 
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aggression that could trigger an international criminal trial. But there is a 
significant disanalogy.  If a physical attack occurs on a person’s body there 
are serious repercussions for the rest of the body—any attack will cause 
bruising or bleeding that will adversely affect the functions or stability of 
the rest of the body.  But as indicated above, States can have as part of their 
territories land that is not contiguous with the mainland, or in any event land 
that when attacked will not necessarily affect the rest of the State’s territory 
or ‘body.’ 
One could object to this proposal that a State is more than a mere 
population within a territory.  A State is also a territorial jurisdiction in 
which it has a monopoly of enforcement power. Insofar as a State’s en-
forcement jurisdiction is limited by an occupation of part of its territory, the 
State becomes less of a State than it was before. Indeed, the traditional way 
of understanding aggression was to see it as merely involving a violation of 
territorial integrity or political sovereignty, and this characterization sur-
vived in the drafting of the United Nations Charter.6 This “Statist” way to 
understand aggression has been dominant for a very long time, but it is 
wrong-headed. 
One could accept the traditional way of understanding aggression if 
one were interested in a merely stipulative legal meaning of the term. But if 
one is interested in a definition of aggression that was normatively persua-
sive, more is needed than merely a reference to violating territorial integrity 
or political sovereignty.  At very least, a normative defense of territory or 
sovereignty would be needed.  And in addition, one would have to give 
some normative rationale for thinking that continuing as a State is indeed 
always worthwhile. Defining “aggression” this way cannot be done in gen-
eral, but only by reference to a State’s protection of human rights.7     
Another objection could be made on similar grounds—namely, to 
the idea that aggression can involve the repelling of a State that has invaded 
the territory of a friendly State.  Again, since the friendly State’s territory is 
not analogous to a human person’s body, it is not clear why invasion per se 
should count as aggression that warrants retaliation and that is not itself 
considered aggression. There are also serious objections to the third ratio-
nale for aggression—adapted from Thomas More—namely, that it is not 
aggression to liberate an oppressed people in the name of humanity. Huma-
nitarian wars pose an especially difficult problem for an account like 
More’s. The general presumption in favor of State’s not being attacked if 
6 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
7 See DAVID RODIN, WAR AND SELF-DEFENSE 109–10 (2002) (extending an argument in 
support of the view that something other than State self-defense is necessary for understand-
ing the wrongness of aggression). 
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they have not attacked other States is in need of a normative rationale, 
which is generally lacking in the literature on aggression. 
There is an initial way to get out of some of these traditional prob-
lems and still save the main idea behind More’s account.  My initial propos-
al is that defense of self or others that aims to protect the core of the State, 
that is its human population and essential economic and political institutions 
that protect this population, should not count as aggression. In addition, 
military action that involves self-defense of a State’s core population and 
the institutions that support that population should also not constitute ag-
gression.8 Whenever another State acts in a way that threatens a given popu-
lation or its supporting institutions, then rising to defend that State from 
such assaults is not itself a form of aggression.  And the main rationale here 
is drawn in terms of the value of, and need for protection of, the human 
rights of members of a population. But defense of a population is not the 
same as defense of a territory. 
II. AGGRESSION AND FIRST STRIKE
It is seemingly even harder to say what constitutes aggressive war 
than what does not. Sixteenth Century philosophers provide some inspira-
tion. For example, Francisco Vitoria said, “assuming that a prince has au-
thority to make war, he should first of all not go seeking occasions and 
causes of war.”9 In Vitoria’s view, in most situations sovereigns act aggres-
sively when they initiate war.10 War is prima facie aggressive if the first 
State to use violent force does so for reasons other than the three mentioned 
above, namely for self-defense, defense of an ally, or to liberate an op-
pressed people, insofar as those are linked to human rights protection.11 The 
first strike element of aggression is not alone sufficient but it does seem to 
be necessary for a prima facie showing of aggression. 
The first strike element is meant to separate those who initiate vi-
olence and those who merely respond or retaliate.12 Again the idea is intui-
tively related to the case of human persons. In a barroom brawl, one of the 
first questions on the table is who threw the first punch. Of course, this can 
sometimes be countered by the claim that the first person to act was not the 
8 My idea of defining legitimate State self-defense in terms of protection of the core 
population of a State is similar to Michael Walzer’s discussion of “the survival and freedom 
of political communities.” See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS passim (1977).
9 FRANCISCO VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI REFLECTIONES (Ernest Nys ed., John 
Pawley Bates trans., 1917) (1557), reprinted in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 
(James Brown Scott ed., 1983). 
10 See id. at 163–87.  
11 Id. at 170–71. 
12 See id. (describing just causes for war and differentiating between offensive and defen-
sive).
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one who threw the punch but the one who provoked the first punch, perhaps 
by the use of insults. So the first strike element should not be understood 
literally as the first State to use violence. The first strike element is an at-
tempt to get people to try to see which State wrongly started a causal chain 
that resulted in a war, and hence which State is normatively prima facie the 
aggressor.
My amendment to, or clarification of, the traditional Just War way 
of understanding aggression is that “first strike” should be seen as short-
hand for “first wronging” rather than about which State literally engaged in 
physical assault first. It may seem odd to say that the State that provokes is 
an aggressor, rather than the State that launches an attack. But history has 
shown many examples of States that try to start wars stealthily by provoking 
another State to use violence that can then be countered by supposedly self-
defensive violence.  Think of a state that menacingly moves its troops to the 
border of another State thereby provoking that other State to attack first.  
For this idea not to be quite so odd, think of “strike” as a metaphor for the 
one first to act in a seriously wrongful way in a chain of events that leads to 
war. The State that “strikes” first then has a kind of burden since it is on the 
face of it (prima facie) the aggressor unless it can prove that the first strike 
should not be regarded as wrongful. On the view taken over from More and 
Vitoria, only certain wrongs can warrant initiation of war. This would help 
make things much clearer than they often were in the Just War tradition, 
especially in the writings of those like Augustine who said that war is unjust 
unless initiated to right a wrong or avenge an injustice.13
Engaging in acts that start a war also should not count as aggression 
when we are under something like “compulsion.” The wrongs that should 
compel us to wage war are only those that concern the defense of human 
rights of one’s own or another people.14 A State may be compelled to go to 
the aid of another State or group within another State, as well as to act in 
self-defense. And as the Seventeenth Century founder of international law, 
Hugo Grotius, says, war is justified only if it is done to ward off a clear 
danger to life, not just to property, that is “immediate and imminent in point 
of time.”15 Grotius makes this point to counter those, like Alberico Gentili, 
who contended that mere fear of any sort was sufficient to justify what Gro-
tius called “anticipatory slaying.”16 Grotius argued that the danger must not 
be merely assumed, but must be shown to require immediate action because 
13 AUGUSTINE, supra note 2, at 862. 
14 See VITORIA, supra note 9, at 187. 
15 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS 173 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon 
Press 1925) (1625).  
16 See id. at 173; LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 78–79 (2008).  
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of the impending harm that would result to the victim.17 If an assailant seiz-
es weapons and acts in a menacing manner, this may be enough to justify 
anticipatory violence, as long as there is a necessity that one strike the first 
blow to avoid the imminent danger.18
So first strike will only be a prima facie, not an all things consi-
dered, determination of which State is the aggressor. The State that defends 
self or other against an imminent and unjustified attack may be compelled 
to strike first, but it is not the aggressor. Indeed, another way to characterize 
this situation is to say that the State that is threatening to attack has already 
in effect been the one to “strike” first. Of course, if the “threatening” State 
is only beginning to plan for a possible attack, or if its leaders are merely 
making bellicose speeches, the attack is not imminent and the State that 
attacks to prevent the threat from being actualized is still the first to strike 
and as a result the prima facie aggressor. 
While still somewhat preliminary, the ideas of the Just War theor-
ists, especially More, Vitoria, and Grotius’ highly plausible ideas, provide 
useful guidance for proving a State was an aggressor. We could think of the 
prima facie case for proving State aggression as involving the first use of 
armed force by one State that wrongs another State not justified by self-
defense, the defense of an innocent State being attacked, or the liberation of 
an oppressed people in the name of humanity. For simplicity these three 
latter reasons may be collapsed into one concept, namely, “self defense or 
defense of others.” However, this phrase is not meant to include anything 
more than what Thomas More meant, with the changes indicated above, 
most importantly the reference to human rights. And in any event some 
preemptive wars will be justified by this criterion since when one State has 
menacingly built up its armies on the border of another State, self-defense 
or defense of others may call for the first use of armed force rather than to 
wait for a first strike attack by another State.19 Yet in this case, not all such 
threats will do, but only those that are serious, immediate, and imminent. 
The next section will explain how this historically based understanding of 
State aggression can shed light on contemporary debates in international 
law.
Traditionally, it was thought that invasion, or threatened invasion, 
gave the invaded State a just cause for waging war.20 For instance, Thomas 
More said: “Utopians go to war only for good reasons: [1] to protect their 
own land, [2] to drive invading armies from the territories of their friends, 
or [3] to liberate an oppressed people in the name of humanity, from tyran-
17 2 GROTIUS, supra note 15 at 173–75. 
18 Id. at 173–74. 
19 See 2 GROTIUS, supra note 15, at 172–73. 
20 LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 47–48 (2008).  
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ny and servitude.”21 The second and third reasons given seem as valid today 
as they were when More expressed them nearly 500 years ago. But concern-
ing the rationale of invasion, Hugo Grotius’s explanations should be fol-
lowed rather than More. In 1625 Grotius said: “Right reason . . . do[es] not 
prohibit all use of force, but only that use of force which is in conflict with 
society, that is which attempts to take away the rights of another.”22
States are not justified in going to war against other States merely to 
protect territory or property, unless that territory was occupied. The reason 
for this is that war involves the killing of many people and it is not at all 
clear why it would be a just cause to wage a war that involved such killings 
merely to preserve territory. Indeed, if the State in question was not protect-
ing the rights of its members, it is also unclear why a State would be justi-
fied in going to war to preserve its sovereignty. Following a Grotian prin-
ciple of just cause provides a framework to figure out a way to connect just 
cause better with what the principle is ultimately to justify, namely the kill-
ing of many people in war.  
Any plausible reconceptualizing of the principle of just cause must 
limit just cause to those circumstances where going to war will provide 
overriding reasons to counter the presumption that war is nearly always 
wrong because of the risk of killing the innocent. If a States is going to go to 
war and risk killing many people, some of whom will surely be innocent, 
there must be something at stake that is at least as important as what is 
risked. Lots of killing is always risked when a State resorts to war, and this 
must be balanced against what is to be gained from the war. Here the most 
important consideration is that recourse to war not be even prima facie per-
mitted unless what war aims at is truly significant, and on the order of pre-
venting the killing of lots of people, thereby restricting what counts as just 
cause to connect to the minimization of the destruction of human life or at 
least to the promotion of human rights.  
My proposal is that just cause be reconceptualized to be:  prevent-
ing or stopping a wrong committed by a State, or State-like entity, against 
another State, or subsection of a State, which is sufficiently morally serious 
to be analogous to the risk of large loss of life that war involves.  On my 
proposal, just causes for war concern preventing or stopping wrongs from 
occurring, not retaliating against States for committing wrong. Just causes 
for war are not merely violations of territorial integrity, but only ones that 
involve threats to the lives, or basic human rights, of the members of a 
State. Just causes for war are not merely violations of a State’s sovereignty 
by another State, unless the State whose sovereignty is violated is protecting 
21 THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 85 (George M. Logan & Robert M. Adams eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1989).  
22 See 2 GROTIUS, supra note 15, at 53. 
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the human rights of its members and can no longer do so, or where the sove-
reignty violation jeopardizes human rights in some other significant way.  
III. THE MORAL AMBIGUITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
As noted above, Thomas More listed the liberation of an oppressed 
people in the name of humanity, from tyranny and servitude, as a just cause 
for war.23 And as far back as the early middle ages, Augustine, the founder 
of the Just War tradition, had said that defense of others was a better reason 
to go to war than defense of self since the former was more selfless. Today, 
humanitarian intervention has once again replaced self-defensive war and 
become the favored example of those who think there are clear cases of 
morally justified wars. Surely if there are morally justified wars, then wars 
fought to stop a genocide or to curtail crimes against humanity are more 
likely to be justified, rather than wars fought to gain territory or convert 
heathens.
But there is an unfortunate part of most wars fought for humanita-
rian reasons: innocent people will be killed. This is the inevitable result of 
all wars, and even more likely to occur in humanitarian wars since there is 
often no clear military target that needs to be destroyed, such as a supply 
depot. Indeed, recent humanitarian wars have been waged in such a way as 
to be directed against civilian targets to get the civilian population to put 
political pressure on a government to stop a genocide. Or as in the recent 
case of Rwanda, where the civilian population was involved in massive 
killing, it looked like it would take attacks on that civilian population to stop 
the genocide.24
In order to win most humanitarian wars, one must try to break the 
will of a part of a population that is oppressing another part of a population, 
rather than merely to defeat the enemy army in certain military campaigns.25
And to break a people’s will, infrastructure and population centers often 
must be attacked. Yet, if it is true that a large part of a population is compli-
cit in causing, or allowing, a genocidal campaign, perhaps a war that must 
target that civilian population is not so difficult to justify after all.26
23 See supra note 1.  
24 LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 47–48, 273–74 (2008). 
25 I am thinking primarily of humanitarian wars aimed at ending genocidal campaigns 
rather than those aimed at ending a civil war. As Brook Sadler has pointed out to me, the 
latter are easier to justify since the sovereign State may welcome intervention and in addition 
there are clear-cut military targets. But such wars are not unproblematic since one needs to 
side with one party over another, whereas in the case of stopping genocide it is easy to see 
which side has the moral high ground. 
26 See generally ETHICS AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION (Deen K. Chatterjee & Don E. Scheid 
eds., 2003) (containing essays that analyze the theories of just war, humanitarian interven-
tion, and political secession). 
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The reason why humanitarian intervention has been so controversial 
is that it is hard to characterize the acts by the State that has caused the hu-
manitarian crisis as having threatened either the State that intervenes or the 
world community. And for this reason it is hard to see that the offending 
State has engaged in a first strike or otherwise provoked the attack by the 
intervening State.  And without any provocation, at least based on the tradi-
tional elements of what constitutes State aggression, where unprovoked first 
strikes are paradigmatically cases of State aggression, it looks like the State 
that has engaged in humanitarian intervention has itself engaged in an act of 
aggression.
Of course, since the State has gone to war for defense of the rights 
of others, in my view of what counts as aggression, it is not clearly an ex-
ample of State aggression.  Yet, what is in question is whether this kind of 
defense of others, where the other in question is not itself a State that is be-
ing attacked, can justify intervention. It is odd indeed to call the humanita-
rian actions of a State by the name aggression since that implies that there is 
some hostility behind the intervention.  If the intervention is truly motivated 
by humanitarian concerns, then calling it aggression and therefore also hos-
tile seems out of place.
Still, it is difficult to see humanitarian intervention that risks the 
horrors of war as a paradigmatically good thing to do or as an example of a 
paradigmatically justified war. Anything that increases the likelihood of 
major loss of civilian life must at best be a necessary evil, surely not a para-
digmatically justified war. The morally ambiguous character of humanita-
rian intervention is made even more clear when one realizes that humanita-
rian wars are more likely than other wars to involve massive civilian casual-
ties.27 Such considerations contribute to the continuing debate today about 
how to regard humanitarian intervention.28
IV. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Consider the state of international law today regarding the case of 
humanitarian interventions. In the 1986 Nicaragua case,29 the International 
Court of Justice points to a problem with humanitarian intervention. The 
case concerned the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors by the CIA, and by “con-
tras,” who were merely paid operatives of the U.S. The U.S. tried to topple 
the Nicaraguan government in the early 1980s, as a means to prevent what it 
27 George R. Lucas, From jus ad bellum to jus ad pacem, in ETHICS AND FOREIGN 
INTERVENTION, id, at 78–79. 
28 See LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 274, 291 (2008). 
29 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14, 56–57 (June 
27).
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predicted would be massive human rights violations by the communist gov-
ernment of Nicaragua in the region.30  Here is part of the Court’s judgment: 
In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the 
situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force 
could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect. 
With regard to the steps actually taken, the protection of human rights, a 
strictly humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining of 
ports … which is based on the right of collective self-defense.31
This ICJ opinion seems to see humanitarian intervention to prevent human 
rights abuses as just one form of aggression. Yet, there has been a contro-
versy about how to interpret this ICJ opinion, some reading it narrowly as 
applying only to the unusual factual circumstances of this case and others 
seeing in it a broad condemnation of humanitarian intervention. 
Ian Brownlie, writing in 1963, says this of the doctrine of humanita-
rian intervention: 
The state practice justifies the conclusion that no genuine case of humani-
tarian intervention has occurred, with the . . . embarrassing exception pro-
vided by Germany [by its claim to be going to the aid of oppressed Ger-
mans in Czechoslovakia], the institution has disappeared from modern 
state practice. As a matter of legal and international policy this is a benefi-
cial development. The institution did not conspicuously enhance state rela-
tions and was applied only against weak states. It belongs to an era of un-
equal relations. Many modern authorities either ignore humanitarian inter-
vention or expressly deny that such a right to intervene exists.32
Brownlie points to the fact that even when discussions “in the Sixth 
Committee of the General Assembly” in the 1960s considered “whether 
action taken by a state to prevent genocide against a racially related minori-
ty in a neighboring state” would be aggression, many of the delegates said 
that it would.33 If stopping genocide was not then considered to be sufficient 
to justify the initiation war, it is hard to imagine any other humanitarian 
goal that could have done so.   
One reason for the reluctance of the international legal community 
to accept the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is that there have been 
so many cases of mixed motives on the part of governments who have 
claimed to be engaging solely in humanitarian efforts.34 Brownlie’s refer-
ence to Nazi Germany is a case in point. Hitler claimed to be engaged in a 
30 Id. at 134. 
31 Id. at 134–35. 
32 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES, 340–41 (1963). 
33 Id. at 341. 
34 See id. at 339–40. 
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humanitarian war to stop atrocities against native German peoples in the 
Sudentanland portion of Czechoslovakia. Yet it was also clear that Hitler 
was engaged in a power grab in Eastern Europe that had nothing to do with 
humanitarian motives. 
From 1960 to the present day, sentiments have changed but it is 
probably fair to say that the vast majority of international law scholars still 
find wars waged for humanitarian reasons to be illegal as of this writing in 
2009. Indeed, most of the authorities today continue to think of humanita-
rian intervention as a form of aggression. Nonetheless, wars waged for hu-
manitarian reasons, such as NATO’s attempt to stop ethnic cleansing in 
Kosovo by its brief war against Serbia, are sometimes described as para-
digmatically justified wars.35
Two UN Security Council Resolutions, concerning the terrorist at-
tacks against the US on September 11, 2001, seem to open the door to a 
broader right of self-defense of States than had previously been acknowl-
edged in international law.36 Yet, this is a very recent movement, although 
one that is often strongly represented in the media and in moral and political 
theory.  And there has been a counter movement, spurred by an Internation-
al Court of Justice ruling about the US bombing of Iranian oil platforms, 
which seemed to attempt to close the door of broadening self-defense that 
the Security Council resolutions had opened.37
Some legal scholars have recently supported the idea that some hu-
manitarian wars can be legally fought. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter dec-
lares:  
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations.38
Michael Reisman argues that humanitarian wars are not 
straightforward violations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: 
Since a humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a 
challenge to the political independence of the State involved and is not on-
ly not inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations but is rather in 
35 LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 276 (2008).  
36 See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
37 See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.H. 90, 203 (Nov. 6).  
38 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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conformity with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the charter, it 
is a distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4).39
If the intent is to save a people from annihilation, it is possible that there 
was no additional intent to change the territorial boundaries or political in-
dependence of a State. 
Critics of this legal argument respond that any humanitarian war 
will cross borders and this is surely a violation of the territorial integrity of 
the State.40 Here is one common response, provided by Oscar Schachter:  
The idea that wars waged in a good cause such as democracy and human 
rights would not involve a violation of territorial integrity or political in-
dependence demands an Orwellian construction of those terms.41   
And this view seems reasonable if we just look at the wording of the UN 
Charter. 
While a growing number of scholars in moral and political theory 
argue that some humanitarian wars are justified,42 the majority of legal 
scholars continue to follow Schachter here, and the Nicaragua case contin-
ues to be cited as the main precedent in international law, despite the failure 
of the international community to condemn NATO’s humanitarian war 
against Serbia to stop the persecution of the Kosovar Albanians.43 In gener-
al, while international law may be in flux about humanitarian intervention, 
legal scholars have not followed their colleagues in political and moral phi-
losophy in urging whole-scale changes in what appear to be straightforward 
applications of jus ad bellum concepts.
V. DEFENDING HUMANITARIAN WARS
One can mount a limited defense of humanitarian wars based on 
some of the ideas of the Eighteenth Century theorist, Emer de Vattel. Per-
haps humanitarian wars can be justified by reference to Vattel’s principle of 
39 W. Michael Reisman & Myres McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the 
Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 177 (Richard Lillich ed., 
1973).
40 Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 645, 649
(1984); see also J.L Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION DEBATE 15, 38 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O’Keohane eds., 2003). 
41 Schachter, supra note 40, at 649.
42 The most prominent scholar to argue in this vein is Allen Buchanan. 
43 The Congo case, discussed in Chapter 10, has also raised the question of whether a State 
that is being attacked for humanitarian reasons can justifiably defend itself. The ICJ has not 
given a clear answer to this question, although I have given reason to think that a State can 
provoke humanitarian force by other states and not normally then legitimately claim that it 
acts in self-defense to repel that force. 
2009] HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND TERRORISM 333
humanity, namely, when it is in a State’s power to help other States without 
risking greater harm to itself, it is permissible (perhaps even obligatory) to 
do so.44 Vattel worried about how the application of this principle could 
disrupt sovereignty. And we have also wondered about the risk of civilian 
casualties from humanitarian war.45 One way to modify the Vattelian prin-
ciple to respond to such worries is to stipulate that one has a responsibility 
to act only if one does not risk greater harm to self or others. We should also 
stipulate that the States must have very good grounds for thinking that the 
State or people to be rescued are truly in need of, and desire, rescue.  
Vattel worried that humanitarian wars would often jeopardize what-
ever good there is from having stable sovereign States.46 But, Vattel also 
said that the most obvious case where such worries were not clearly overrid-
ing, concerned situations where there was a civil war or at least where it was 
not clear where sovereignty resided.47 Expanding on this idea and extrapo-
lating to emergency situations generally, we could say that humanitarian 
wars should only be allowed where what is to be gained is not overridden 
by the negative effects on sovereignty that occur due to such intervention.  
Such considerations would naturally fall under the category of potential 
harm to others by waging humanitarian wars. Only when the risks from 
intrusion on sovereignty are less than the gains from such intrusion, can 
humanitarian wars be justified on this reconstruction of Vattel’s position.  
Proportionality consideration would be key here. 
There is a significant worry about the loss of life to civilians in hu-
manitarian wars.  But these losses may nonetheless be justified, yet only in 
very few cases, if the sheer extent of the humanitarian crisis is so large as to 
outweigh considerations of the lives of the innocent that are risked by the 
attempt to stop the crisis through military means. If innocent lives are on 
both sides of the balance sheet, there is no reason to think that greater sav-
ing of lives cannot justify lesser loss of lives, assuming that there is no other 
way to save the greater number of lives than by war.  
It might be possible to justify even the targeting of civilians if it 
could be shown that this was necessary to save many more lives than those 
that were risked by the targeting. It is sometimes said that the intentional 
targeting of civilians can never be justified.48 Vattel’s position is more com-
pelling. We could follow Vattel in thinking that there can be emergency 
44 See EMER DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE (Carne-
gie Institute 1916) (1758), reprinted in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (James 
Brown Scott ed., 1983).  
45 Id. at 131. 
46 See id.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 130. 
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situations where such a large number of innocent people is threatened by the 
actions of a State, or where there is so much potential harm to the world 
community, say by a genocidal campaign, that what is normally banned 
may sometimes be allowed.  Of course, emergency situations do not have 
much precedent. But that is just to reaffirm what has been thought at least 
since Augustine, namely, that all war, even humanitarian war, can only be 
justified, if at all, in the most extreme cases of harm that can be prevented in 
no other way.  
It is also hard to see that humanitarian interventions constitute 
wrongs at all, let alone the most important of wrongs in the international 
arena, and hence we have reason to think that crossing State borders is not 
always wrong. Humanitarian intervention may indeed often be ill advised 
since anything that contributes to the horrors of war is to be avoided at near-
ly all costs. But if the motivation for the humanitarian intervention is to stop 
genocide, then the war may not be ill advised even though there is a serious 
risk of the kind of major loss of civilian life that occurs in most wars.  Here, 
we need some rudimentary utilitarian calculation in order to see that stop-
ping genocide by means of a war could be justified.  
It is next to impossible to justify all humanitarian wars, but at least 
some humanitarian wars may be justified even strongly so. Many humanita-
rian wars will violate the proportionality principle in that more harm to the 
civilian population or to the security of the region will occur from these 
wars than the good that is done by waging them. But some humanitarian 
wars will not run afoul of the proportionality principle since they will con-
front genocides and other mass crimes with less loss of life through the con-
duct of the war itself. In addition, many humanitarian wars do not meet the 
last resort principle since war has rarely been able to stop, at least not for 
very long, mass crimes like genocide from occurring in ways that diploma-
cy often can. But there surely are some humanitarian wars that seem to sa-
tisfy the last resort principle and are likely to have some efficacy. And the 
justification of such wars will indeed be best grounded in collective respon-
sibility principles.49
Think of a war waged to stop the genocide in the Darfur region of 
the Sudan. The Sudanese government, if the near anarchy in the Sudan is a 
government, has shown itself unwilling or unable to stop the slaughter.50
Diplomatic efforts have been tried and have all failed miserably. The at-
tempts by the United Nations to put peace-keeping troops in place have met 
with strong resistance and the death of many peace-keepers. Threats of eco-
49 See LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 292 (2008).  
50 See Steven R. Weisman, Powell Says Rapes and Killings in Sudan are Genocide, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at A3 (quoting former Secretary of State Colin Powell saying “geno-
cide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear 
the responsibility, and [ ] genocide may still be occurring”). 
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nomic boycotts and incentives of economic aid have similarly failed to 
achieve a stop to the carnage in the refugee camps. This is the kind of case 
where it looks like war might be the last resort to ending the genocide and 
doing what the international community has a collective responsibility to 
do.51
Indeed, it seems that the failure to go to war to end genocides of the 
sort that are occurring in Darfur would indicate a failure of the international 
community to enforce its most widely praised multi-lateral treaty, namely 
the Genocide Convention, and hence a serious failure of international law 
itself. If law is not enforced then it ceases to have any claim to be called 
law. In international law, an area of law already thought of as controversial-
ly labeled “law” at best, there is an especially pressing reason to demon-
strate that there is enforcement of the most widely accepted provisions of 
international law.52 Failure to intervene in places like Darfur, in order to 
stop the flagrant violation of the Genocide Convention is also a major fail-
ure of international law. 
Humanitarian wars can at least be prima facie defended in such cir-
cumstances as the genocide in Darfur. Such wars might be technically ag-
gressive, at least according to traditional doctrine, in that they involve inva-
sion by one State against another State that is resisting rather than consent-
ing to the invasion. Yet, since there is no “hostility” that motivates the in-
vading State, and if the international community in effect consents to allow 
the invasion to occur, it seems as if the designation of aggression is, at best, 
the kind of technical characterization that doesn’t bear much normative 
weight. Aggression, as traditionally understood, is not itself a trigger of 
normative disapproval, since some aggression, such as that form that stops 
worse aggression could be a very good thing indeed, as theorists from the 
Just War tradition and contemporary international law have claimed.53 This 
is one reason I urged that we abandon the traditional way of understanding 
aggression.
  The major problem with humanitarian intervention wars is that despite 
their lofty aims they are still wars. And because they are wars often with no 
clear military targets, there will be innocent civilians who will be killed, 
perhaps in very large numbers. And the horrors of war do not stop just with 
the killing of the innocent, no matter how unintended, but extend to massive 
injuries and infrastructure damage that may take a generation to overcome. 
Because of the likelihood of the civilian casualties involved, wars of huma-
nitarian intervention remain morally and legally problematical. Yet, when it 
really does seem like the last hope for saving many lives, saving wide-scale 
51 LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 276 (2008).  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 292–93. 
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injury, and saving property from mass destruction, then sometimes such 
wars seem worth it. And those who initiate and wage such wars, have not 
clearly done wrong when they pursue humanitarian intervention as a strate-
gy for the promotion of international law. 
VI. TERRORIST AGGRESSION AND THE TREATMENT OF TERRORISTS
Like humanitarian intervention, terrorist aggression pushes the limit 
of the conceptual and normative categories that this article has discussed. In 
particular, the idea of terrorist aggression calls into question the idea that the 
world is composed largely of State actors and that the ad bellum rules of 
war are primarily a matter of regulating State behavior. When non-State 
actors are added into the mix, the central categories are disrupted.  
There is no reason to think that only States can wage aggressive 
wars. In contemporary times, we have seen non-State actors, including ter-
rorist groups, wage war against States and against other non-State actors. 
Amending a definition offered by Andrew Valls, terrorism is violence 
committed by State or non-State actors directed against civilians or their 
property for political purposes.54 In the Just War tradition, wars by non-
State actors were not generally contemplated because the legitimate authori-
ty to wage war resided only in States. There is an interesting exception, 
which is explored below, concerning piracy as a form of aggression by non-
State actors. This section argues that the jus ad bellum principles discussed 
above apply to some terrorist groups, and that when the leaders of such 
groups wage aggressive war they should be confronted by international le-
gal institutions. This section also argues that when terrorists are confronted 
and prosecuted they should be afforded the same rights as when State lead-
ers are similarly confronted and prosecuted. 
The strategy I adopt, of allowing that some terrorist groups can 
wage war and that terrorist leaders can be prosecuted for waging aggressive 
war, as long as such prosecutions are subject to the rule of law, recognizes 
the reality of the contemporary situation where there are multiple types of 
actors on the world stage. Non-State actors have increasingly become domi-
nant players especially in a world where many States are quite weak, and 
where groups that have not been elected can operate in a State’s territory 
unhindered by even the authorities that have been designated to serve all of 
the people of that State. My strategy does not maintain the fiction that only 
State leaders can operate in State territories and wage war against other 
States or peoples. 
54 Andrew Valls, Can Terrorism be Justified?, in ETHICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 68
(Andrew Valls ed., 2000), reprinted in LARRY MAY, ERIC ROVIE & STEVE VINER, THE 
MORALITY OF WAR 318 (2006). 
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There is an interesting initial question of whether some terrorist 
groups can ever resemble sovereign States in the world. For if the answer is 
no, then it seems that it makes little sense to talk of terrorist groups waging 
aggressive war, or any kind of war. This is an especially hard case for a 
theory of aggression and a consideration of jus ad bellum principles. In gen-
eral my strategy is to treat non-State actors like States when non-State ac-
tors behave in similar ways to that of States. This section addresses the idea 
of terrorist aggression initially through several levels. It revisits the Seven-
teenth Century debates about how to treat pirates, especially concerning the 
ability of pirates to wage naval battles and seize State ships. In the end it 
discusses what are the special human rights concerns that prosecuting ter-
rorists entails, and how best to maintain the rule of law even in the face of 
terrorist aggression.
Alberico Gentili, writing at the end of the Sixteenth Century, pro-
vides a good place to begin.  He argues that the laws of war do not apply to 
pirates since they stand outside the system of rules that governs States dur-
ing times of war.  
There is another reason why such men do not come under the law of war, 
namely, because that law is derived from the law of nations, and malefac-
tors do not enjoy the privileges of a law to which they are foes. How can 
the law, which is nothing but an agreement and a compact, extend to those 
who have withdrawn from the agreement and broken the treaty of the hu-
man race as Florus puts it? Pirates are the common enemies of all mankind 
[hostes humani generis].55
This is representative of Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century thinkers on the 
topic, but not of thinkers who wrote in earlier centuries of the Just War tra-
dition.  
The early Just War theorists were not as committed to the idea that 
only States can justly wage war.  At least part of the explanation is that until 
the Sixteenth Century there was not as clear a divide between States and 
other political entities and similarly it was not clear that non-State actors 
were always illegitimate. Unincorporated non-State actors were much more 
plentiful in these early eras, and it was not out of the question that they 
could wage just wars in self-defense. There is also an old tradition of think-
ing that everyone is entitled to humane treatment, even those who are our 
worst enemies. Indeed, there was somewhat of a debate in the early Seven-
teenth Century about whether even pirates should be treated humanely, al-
though it should be clear that thinkers like Gentili were on the side of the 
majority of theorists that denied this thesis. 
55 Alberico Gentili, DE JURE BELLI [The Law of War] at 22 (John Rolfe, trans., Clarendon 
Press 1933) (1598). 
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Before leaving Gentili, here is a comment on the idea of hostes hu-
mani generis, common enemies of humanity, a term which today is some-
times also applied to terrorists. This term, or an equivalent, was probably 
first used by Cicero in his De Officiis.56 But while the term appears to be 
used in both more ancient sources as well as in Seventeenth Century de-
bates, it is not at all clear that the term has always had the same meaning.57
Indeed, it seems that there are several distinct meanings of hostes humani 
generis that are not necessarily related to each other. 
(1) One of the earliest examples of the idea behind this term relates simply 
to people who had rejected the rules of how States are to be formed, and 
lived without a centralized authority.  
(2) The term also seems sometimes to have been applied to those political 
associations, even States, which failed to follow the rules that other States 
had established concerning property or preservation of life. 
(3) The term seems to have been used most often for those bands of rob-
bers who operated on the high seas and recognized no rules of property or 
preservation of life. 
It is interesting to speculate why these very different examples 
came to be captured with the same term and what it was that made people 
think that each case is truly a threat to humanity, not merely to those States 
in the region where they operated. 
The rationale for seeing the groups in the first category as enemies 
of humanity is merely that they reject the model of State formation as the 
way to organize political society. One can think of examples today of unin-
corporated groups that manage to function well and not to threaten their 
neighbors unduly. Not organizing as States is only the loosest of threats to 
humanity, and is really only a threat if one thinks that States are the best 
form of political organization. Indeed, one could see the proliferation of 
forms of political organization as a healthy, indeed perhaps necessary, 
means to promote the development of humanity. 
The second category is also not obviously a group that poses a 
threat to humanity. At least in part it depends on whether the rules that most 
States live by are better than the rules that the non-State actors, or “rogue” 
States, subscribe to. Here there are three distinct possibilities: the rules of 
the rogue State are worse than, better than, or no worse than those of the 
other States. Only in the first case is there cause for alarm, as is true today 
when some terrorist groups seem to have completely different rules of en-
gagement that put civilians at much greater risk than would be true if they 
56 See ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 15–17 (2d ed. 1995). 
57 Id. 90–95. 
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followed the traditional rules of engagement of States and their armies.58
Humanity would not be harmed if there were merely different rules that one 
State, or non-State actor, followed than were followed by other States. 
There is often some loss in predictability or efficiency when there is no con-
formity of rule following, but such a situation hardly places humanity in 
jeopardy. 
The third category is the worrisome one, since here the non-State 
actor simply does not play by the rules at all, and is seemingly unrestrained 
in its behavior toward all with whom it comes into contact. The pirates who 
flew the skull and crossbones might have been signaling that anyone was at 
risk of death who happened to come into contact with these pirates. This 
category seems most clearly to be an enemy of humanity. But even here, it 
depends on whether the non-State actor does in fact have much interaction 
with the rest of the world. If this law-less group kept to itself, such as a 
White supremacist, separatist group in Montana, it is not at all clear that it 
poses a threat to humanity merely by its existence. How they conduct their 
societies may be reprehensible, but if the members are there uncoerced, it 
may be that interference is unjustified nonetheless. 
This third category may also include some contemporary terrorist 
groups. Indeed, what makes some terrorist groups morally and legally prob-
lematic is that they do not recognize the legitimacy of the rules of war, es-
pecially the rule against targeting civilians. In this sense many terrorist 
groups do not play by the rules. But unlike some pirates of old, terrorists 
normally play by other rules than those rules that would be recognized by 
States around the world. Indeed, many terrorist groups see themselves not as 
enemies of humanity but as insurgents fighting repressive regimes.59 There 
is a sense in which some terrorist groups see themselves as acting much as 
some States see themselves acting in situations of humanitarian interven-
tion. In this sense, some terrorist groups not only mainly play by the rules 
but also see themselves as the ultimate protector of those for whom the rules 
are not providing protection. 
One could argue that the mere fact that terrorist groups do not play 
by the same rules as most States makes them a threat to the international 
rules. If there are two alternative sets of rules that one can adhere to, it may 
seem that no one is held to any particular rules at all, thereby undermining 
the continued existence of any rules at all.60 The argument that having alter-
native rules weakens or jeopardizes any rules is not convincing. Think of 
the alternative ways of computing US taxes, or the alternative ways of doing 
58 See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 165 (2d ed. 2004). 
59 See LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 302 (2008). 
60 I am grateful to Cindy Holder for suggesting this objection to me, and for generally an 
excellent set of comments on a paper of mine that was an ancestor to this chapter. See also 
MARK OSIEL, THE END  OF RECIPROCITY (2009).  
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double entry accounting. While cumbersome, and ripe for unfairness, hav-
ing alternative sets of rules between which one can choose, does not neces-
sarily undermine the rules.   
The situation of pirates and their treatment in ancient times may still 
provide valuable lessons for how to regard some terrorists. As Alfred Rubin 
points out, in Roman times some pirate groups were treated as no different 
from small States, where some of these non-State groups were the proper 
subject of war on the part of Rome, and where others were simply given no 
moral or legal status since they were enemies of humanity.61 Today, one 
could similarly divide “terrorist” groups into those that behaved more in 
State-like ways than others. Some pirates were treated like brigands and 
others were given quasi-State status. Today, similarly, terrorist groups like 
the Bader Meinhoff group are more like criminal gangs and brigands, and 
groups like Hamas, which in fact won a significant election in Palestine in 
2006, are sufficiently State-like to be given a different status.62
Before concluding discussion on this topic, it is worth noting that 
Grotius generally opposed Gentili’s views in early international legal 
theory. Grotius claims that pirates are beyond the moral pale in the sense 
that they are “banded together for wrongdoing,”63 yet he thinks that pirates 
should be treated in a moral way. According to Grotius, pirates must have 
their rights protected, not for their own sake, but for the sake of God or oth-
er parties.64 Failure to take the rights of pirates seriously, in a sense jeopar-
dizes the rights themselves since all humans share a common interest in this 
protection of rights.65 There is a difference between asking whether the life 
of a pirate is to be condemned and asking how the rights of pirates should 
be treated, especially in war. Following Grotius here, we can see pirates as 
hostes humani generis and yet still as having rights that need to be pro-
tected. Even as they are common enemies of humanity they are also mem-
bers of humanity. 
Terrorists should be viewed similarly to how Grotius viewed pi-
rates.  Generally those terrorists who are common enemies of humanity are 
nonetheless also members of humanity. As members of humanity, terrorists 
are owed the same human rights considerations as any other member of 
humanity, since human rights attach merely to membership not to what the 
person otherwise deserves. I hope these brief remarks illustrate how Just 
War principles can inform our debates about international law. 
61 OSIEL, id.
62 LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 302 (2008). 
63 2 GROTIUS, supra note 15, at 631. 
64 See id. at 373, 631. 
65 See id. at 373–374. See also LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR 301–23 (2007) 
(arguing for a similar analysis and conclusion of a Grotian position concerning terrorists).  
